INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A UNITARY SYSTEM Anthony D'Amato
The thesis of this Chapter is that rethinking international law as a unitary system will yield important insights into the still-controversial questions of how international law works and what role it plays in international relations. First, however, we should take a moment to make sure that we are talking in the same language.
I. TOWARD A UNIFORM TERMINOLOGY
The terminology of international law has become increasingly imprecise and muddled. As a result, many scholars are talking past each other. Here are some suggested clarifications of some of the more important terms.
It's convenient at the outset to divide international law into consensual law and non-consensual law. The former depends upon the consent of the governed. It includes treaty law and the law of title to territory (territory may no longer be acquired by conquest). The latter-law that applies irrespective of any state's consent--is usually called customary law. The term "customary" is misleading; a better name for it would be "general" international law. Here's a brief summary: acting with opinio juris. Thus, all that seemed to be needed to determine when the path formed or the norm ripened was to test or measure whether states were acting under a belief that the norm in question was legally compulsory.
However, no one in the 4,000-year history of international law has ever been able to determine, even once, whether any state was acting under the belief that its action was compulsory under international law. Obviously states don't have beliefs; states are artificial constructs. Are a state's officials a reasonable surrogate for the state itself? Passage is an international strait, we can be quite certain that they will respond in the negative. If we ask the same question of officials of the United States, we can be equally sure that they will respond in the affirmative. We may well suspect that the uniformity of responses within each of the two states reflects policy and not a penchant for telling the truth to strangers. Presidents and other high government officials only say things that serve their strategic interests.
Hence opinio juris can never be measured. It is not a test for law. For it presupposes that which it seeks.
General international law, or just plain international law, is what states invoke to defend their entitlements against illegal acts by other states. From time to time, some writers will contend that there is no such thing as general international law. Bismarck took this position in the nineteenth century, as did the Soviet Union in the twentieth century. Some officials in the Bush Administration and their academic apologists assert exceptionalism-the idea that the most powerful state is not subject to international law.
Every chapter in the book you are reading refutes these extreme notions. International law provides the legitimate framework within which states interact with each other.
Although some of the more interesting topics of international law concern law-information, it is clear that these topics would not even arise were it not for a shared framework of boundary delimitations laid down by international law. Even the most basic player in international law, namely the state, is defined by international law. We know an entity is a state when international law tells us it is a state.
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In short, if a new state calls itself a state, it is in fact scanning the panorama of legal rules that tell us what a state is. If the facts comport with its assertions, the new state is close to achieving statehood. .
II. ANALYTICAL ADVANTAGES OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
International law is often, in fact off-handedly, called a system. 4 If we take seriously the proposition that it constitutes a system, we just might change forever the way we think about international law and the role it plays in international relations.
The first change in our mind-set is to regard the international legal system In doing so it also defends the long-term interests of A and B in international stability, even if neither A nor B is willing to acknowledge this beneficial input in the heat of their battle with each other. The bottom line is that international law should no longer be viewed as a set of background rules; rather, it is an actual player with real beliefs and objectives that participates in every bilateral or multilateral dispute among states.
The second shift in the way we think about international relations is that the presence of the ILS transforms what was previously analyzable as a two-person zero-sum game (between A and B) into a three-person non-zero-sum game (A, B, and the ILS). 4 The term "unitary system" used in the title of this Chapter is mildly redundant. It is intended to emphasize the difference between the holistic approach taken here and the recent spate of essays that label international law as "fragmented." See., e.g. Of course, the hard-wire explanation, standing alone, is empty. We need to know how the hard wiring came about. To go there, we first need to establish that the ILS is a purposive self-regulating system. We will then find that the hard wiring is the result of a process akin to Darwinian evolution.
III. CONCEPT OF A PURPOSIVE SYSTEM
Systems analysis has been around a long time. At first, static systems were the objects of scientific investigation: think of the steam engine or the wrist watch. The invention of the thermostat in 1885 gave rise to the first cybernetic system, one that seemed to be purposive, namely, keeping room temperature close to a desired norm.
During World War II, John von Neumann developed for the United States Navy a torpedo that, after being aimed at its moving target, would self-adjust its direction to home in to the target as it moved. 6 This, too, seemed to be a purposive system. Many diverse fields, such as engineering, management, and social science, saw the value of cybernetic modeling in their own research. The definition of system has been steadily honed so that today we may define a system as a mechanical or theoretical organization of components, distinct from its environment, that adds something new, and often 6 See Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (1948).
unexpected, to our understanding of the ensemble of components out of which it was constructed. 7 One common definition that was generally accepted by researchers was that a system is a self-organized collection of elements that are interconnected in the sense that any force imparted to one of them affects the positions of all of them. 8 Ludwig von
Bertalanffy defined a system as a "complex of mutually interacting components." 9 But a system is more than that; it is an entity in itself that is different from, and perhaps greater than, the sum of its parts. 10 Accordingly, the ILS has a role in international politics that is more than the sum of the interests of the approximately 190 states that are the creators/subjects/enforcers of international law. 11 It carries an additional "emergent"
weight because it represents the precedents of previous dispute resolutions-the wisdom of the status quo in the dynamic sense described by Edmund Burke. International law was "suspended" during the Roman era because of the absence of a plurality of nations.
14 The concept of recursion was another significant development in general systems theory. We have to acknowledge the fact that any system containing norms (such as the ILS) will find that the norms do not precisely fit the empirical facts of the system's environment. For example, the norm specifying the breadth of the territorial sea might be three miles at a time when most states were proclaiming and enforcing a twelve-mile limit. The disconnect between norm and reality must be resolved if the model system is to be accurate. This disconnect cannot be resolved a priori (who is to say that three miles is "better" than twelve miles?) Model-builders thus resort to pragmatism. They try out certain norms on the environment, and then tinker with them. see whether the environment will react to the norms, or whether the environment is being stubborn such as to require the model to make adjustments. This back-and-forth adjustment process is called recursion. It reduces a large circularity into a set of tiny circles each of which can be adjusted. If the process is successful, the system will contain a rule that both explains the facts and justifies them.
To be sure, a newcomer to international law might object that a recursive process cannot be costless. Recursion dulls the edge of the rules and hence in the long run undermines their ability to draw sharp distinctions between tightly argued positions. in preventing war, we find that the 188 swamps the 2. In other words, the rule hardly budged aggregate behavior even though it highly impacted the behavior of two of the states.
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It is thus clear that the development of customary international law over time has ensured the emergence of rules that do not depart appreciably from patterns of state 15 Of course this is an idealized example. When two states want to go to war against each other, they will not often be deterred by the other states. And yet, over the course of the last millennia, the amount of time that nations spent in wars was just a tiny fraction of the amount of time they spent in peace. (My own calculations, not rigorous enough to cite but perhaps offering a topic of study for some reader, was that the amount of time nations spent in wars (= over 1000 battlefield deaths per year) divided by the nations' own lifetimes amounted to approximately 2.4%. This figure is actually plummeting today because there are very few wars and the largest ever number of states.
behavior. This may seem a weakness of international law from a moralistic point of view, but it is also a strength of international law from the self-preserving point of view. To restate the important point made above, the "successful" norms in the Darwinian struggle taking place in the international arena are those that are close to the inferences we would draw from state behavior if there were no such thing as international law. The ILS is interested in an orderly and peaceful international environment that is conducive to the maintenance and perpetuation of the ILS itself. This does not necessarily involve "moral"
or "justice" considerations except to the pragmatic extent that ignoring such considerations might bring about armed conflict that could destabilize the system.
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Light was cast from an unlikely direction on the problem of why and how complex systems can be purposive. In 1980, Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela refined the concept of the self-organization of systems. 17 Their theory of autopoiesis defines living systems as self-producing units which maintain their essential form, perpetuating themselves according to their internal organization. Or otherwise stated, the system produces its own organization that maintains itself in the space in which its components exist.
As a complex system, international law closely resembles the self-regulating systems described by Maturana and Varela. It is separate from its environment but at the same time interacts with its environment. The interaction, of course, consists of providing rules of decision and guidance when conflicts arise between states, and of assessing the 16 The developing law of human rights is an example. Although states remain highly reluctant to outside interference in their internal affairs, human rights would hardly deserve the name if they did not constrain the actions of one's home government. 17 See Humberto R. Maturana/Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition (1980). Autopoiesis is the process by which a system produces its own organization and then maintains itself in the space in which its components exist. See http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/AUTOPOIESIS.html>.
efficacy of those rules in conflict resolution. A recursive process modifies the rules when they need updating. The ILS makes the modifications according to its internal organization and processes. Thus when international lawyers argue the existence of a purported rule of international law and cite various precedents and events in support of their argument, they are obliquely describing the internal organization of the ILS. 18 We can now begin to see that the ILS has no direct interest in reducing conflict or promoting cooperation in its environment-that is, in the real world-but rather is only interested in preserving and maintaining itself. Its purpose is nothing other than the preservation of its own existence. This is the same purpose we find in every animal and every plant in the world. All animals and plants that lacked this purposiveness were 
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The ILS in the example just given was not interested per se in the breadth of the territorial sea. Nor was it even directly interested in reducing friction between coastal states and others that might disfavor encroachments upon the freedom of the seas. Rather, the ILS was interested in preserving itself. Changing the rules of its environment thus becomes desirable from the vantage point of the ILS if there is an overall enhancement of global peace, order, and stability. If the world environment is peaceful and orderly, the ILS will grow and thrive. But if war breaks out, legality could be an early casualty.
Indeed a nation struggling for its life may view war crimes as a trap: if it holds back certain actions because it is law-abiding, the enemy might well disregard legal constraints entirely and thus gain a military advantage. 20 If mankind then somehow saves itself after the global war, there could be no assurance that the old system of international law would be restored. Anarchy could bring about the permanent demise of the ILS.
IV. COERCIVE SYSTEMS
It is one thing to have a legal system; it is another to have people obey it. Do states actually obey international law, or do they simply act in their own interests while simulating obedience? In a chapter published in advance of her forthcoming book coauthored with Dean Harold Koh, 21 Oona Hathaway says that neither advocates nor skeptics of international law are looking at the whole picture:
Both fail to consider the role of internal enforcement of international treaties on countries' decisions to accept international legal limits on their behavior and then to violate or abide by them.
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As a defense of international law, this is very weak tea. Professor Hathaway is only talking about treaties, which have always been the clearer case of compliance with international law (compared to general international law). Second, she is only talking about an extremely limited form of compliance. She is saying in effect that if a state 20 Several decades ago there was public agitation for a no-first-use treaty regarding nuclear weapons. The United States said it would not support such a treaty because it could amount to unilateral disarmament. In other words, the United States would refrain from first use whereas its opponent might simply violate the treaty. The most notorious precedent in this respect occurred in June 1941 when Hitler suddenly invaded his treaty ally the Soviet Union. Stalin was shocked and went into seclusion for the entire first week of the invasion; he could not bring himself to believe that Hitler had done such a thing.. 21 accepts Rule X by incorporating it into its domestic law, then that very incorporation acts as a brake upon political leaders who might otherwise wish to gain a temporary advantage in international relations by violating Rule X. Although this proposition is undoubtedly true (it has been argued by American scholars for years), it amounts at best to saying that states only have to obey the rules of international law that they wish to obey. They may pick and choose, accepting the rules they like and rejecting the others. It is clear that Professor Hathaway has not taken a middle position in the debate. Whatever her intent, she has come down squarely on the side of the skeptics.
Her chapter illustrates a general malaise that younger scholars have with international law. They see the occasional but important violations and gaps that are the very tip of the iceberg while failing to see the vast and complex system of rules beneath the surface that are not only routinely obeyed by nations but are not even questioned.
What nation today would attempt to extend its territorial sea beyond 12 miles? What nation would claim the right to arrest tourists and place them in indefinite detention?
These and millions of other potential violations of general international law do not even come up for consideration.
However, putting aside routine considerations of compliance, the harder cases cannot be ignored. Is international law a coercive system? Are its rules enforceable against the states? How? Are they enforceable against a superpower? If not, then rules of international law are, in Professor Hathaway's words, " mere window dressing." 23 We can be certain of one thing: there has never been a legal system on this planet that allows citizens to decide which laws they will obey. It is no answer to the question of compliance to say that states internalize rules that they decide to internalize.
International-law skeptics such as Professor Hathaway seem to use the term "international law" as a fashionable tag, but their arguments prove that they are not talking about real law at all.
I argue that international rules are enforced in exactly the same way that domestic rules are enforced. Every nation prescribes internal punishments for illegal acts. (Just try to argue to a prosecutor or judge that the law is mere window dressing.) The crucial point is that these punishments consist of deprivations of the defendant's legal rights. When we turn to states as the subjects of international law, obviously a state that transgresses international law cannot be punished by being incarcerated or annihilated.
But each state has a bundle of rights under international law. Indeed, since the state is an artificial entity, it may be said that a state is nothing more than the rights it is accorded by international law. These rights are the flip side of obligations. For example, state A has a right to a twelve-mile territorial sea, and it also has an obligation to respect B's right to a twelve-mile territorial sea.
We now see that the rules of the ILS form a closed loop. countries cooperated by freezing Iranian bank accounts in banks in their countries. The banks were delighted to oblige, because it meant that they might avoid paying interest on the Iranian accounts. The interest rates at that time were at a peak of about 15%.
Eventually Iran caved in, returned the American hostages unharmed, and received access to its bank accounts (but not the earned interest).
V. CONCLUSION
We have seen in Sections II and III above that the ILS gives expression to its database of rules of general international law when the rules are relevant to a dispute or controversy. We have also seen in Section IV that the same database of rules serves the enforcement function of international law: a state that violates international law may expect that one or more of its rights in the database might be suspended as an official reprisal or punishment for the violation. Finally, in addition to its legal competences just mentioned, the ILS represents the political interests of all the states that are not directly involved in a given dispute or controversy.
Given this combination of competences, it is clear that the ILS does not have its counterpart in domestic legal systems:
COMPETENCES
International Legal System Domestic Legal System 3. Represent political interests.
3. Does not represent political interests.
The puzzle for students of international law is not whether international law is effective or whether the ILS is a powerful player in the game of international politics, but rather why the role of international law is so underappreciated. A large part of the reason is the academic separation between departments of political science and law schools. The By taking systems theory seriously, lawyers may find that the ILS as described in this Chapter might serve as the long-awaited interdisciplinary bridge to political science.
It is at the very least an intellectual vehicle for taking rules out of the background of international relations and promoting them to the status of a player in the game of 28 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1946).
international politics. This promotion dramatically changes the nature of the game from a two-person (my country versus all others) zero-sum game to a three-person non-zero-sum game (conflict plus cooperation) that, methodologically and analytically, offers a far more realistic understanding of international relations than either the political scientists or the international lawyers have come up with separately.
-end-
